We identify a sufficient class of coalitional form games with transferable utility for which prenucleolus coincides with the Shapley value.
Introduction
In cooperative game theory with transferable utilities, the Shapley value (Shapley (1953) ) is a widely used solution concept. It always exists, is unique, and given by an explicit formula that pays each player his average marginal contribution. Unlike the Shapley value, the prenucleolus and the nucleolus (Schmeidler (1969) ) are solutions of a minimization problem. The prenucleolus is the set of efficient payoffs that lexicographically minimizes the "dissatisfaction" of all coalitions. The nucleolus is also the solution to a similar minimization problem but differs from the prenucleolus in requiring the payoff vector to be individually rational. The prenucleolus always exists and is unique while the nucleolus is unique but exists only when the set of individually rational and efficient payoff vectors is non-empty. In this paper, we identify conditions under which the prenucleolus coincides with the Shapley value.
It is easy to show that the Shapley value and the prenucleolus coincide on all two player games. From the axiomatization of prenucleolus (Sobolev (1975) ) and the Shapley value (Hart and Mas-Colell (1989)), we know that both these solution concepts satisfy efficiency and symmetry and hence they also coincide on all symmetric TU games. However, the results of Sobolev (1975) and Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) also imply that the prenucleolus and the Shapley value differ in terms of the consistency properties.
1 Therefore, for non-symmetric TU games with three or more players, there is no reason to expect that these two solution concepts to coincide.
Yet, there are applications involving non-symmetric TU games where the Shapley value and the prenucleolus do coincide. This was first demonstrated in the context of undirected graphs and hypergraphs by Deng and Papadimitriou (1994) . Subsequently, van den Nouweland, Borm, Brouwers, Bruinderink and Tijs (1996) applied coalitional form games to telecommunications problems and derive a class of games for which this coincidence takes place. Chun and Hokari (2004) demonstrate the coincidence in the context of a queueing game defined by Maniquet (1999) . The results of these papers can be summarized as saying that the class of 2-games constitute a sufficient condition for the coincidence.
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In this paper we identify a class of TU games, which we call P S games, for which we have this coincidence. In a P S game, each player's marginal contribution to a coalition and its complement coalition adds up to a player specific constant that does not depend on the coalition. We show that this property is sufficient to ensure the coincidence of the Shapley value and the prenucleolus. Furthermore, the class of P S games is more general than the class of 2-games in that while every 2-game is also a P S game, the converse is not true.
We then apply our result to simple games. We show that a simple game is a P S game if and only if it is either dictatorial or 'bi-dictatorial' or a 'joint dictatorship. ' We also show that for a three player non-symmetric simple game, the P S property is also necessary for the coincidence. However, for non-symmetric simple games with more than three players, P S property is not necessary.
Finally, we apply our coincidence result to queueing games. We define a class of queueing games in coalitional form which we call the generalized queueing games. This class includes, as special cases, the queueing game defined by Maniquet (1999) and by Chun (2004) . We then identify the subclass of generalized queueing games that belong to the class of P S games. We refer to this class of games as reasonable queueing games. In particular, all queueing games that are a convex combination of Maniquet's queueing game and Chun's queueing game belongs to this class of reasonable queueing games.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we set up the general model. We provide our main result on the coincidence of prenucleolus and the Shapley value in section 3 and compare it with the existing literature. In section 4, we apply our coincidence result to simple games and generalized queueing games. We conclude our analysis in section 5.
Preliminaries
A coalitional form game with transferable utility (or a TU game) G = (N, v) consists of a finite set N = {1, . . . , n} of players and a function v : 2 N → ℜ that associates with every coalition (or subset) S of N a real number v(S). The number v(S) is the worth of S which is the total payoff that is available for division among the members of S. We define v(∅) = 0. A
be the set of all possible efficient payoff vectors of G. An imputation of G is an efficient payoff profile x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) for which
where Π is the set of all n! orderings of N and
Consider a game G = (N, v). We now define two very similar solution concepts that are related to the dissatisfaction level of a coalition. To measure how unhappy a coalition S will be with a payoff vector x in G, we look at the excess of S with respect to x which is defined as e(S, x) = v(S) − i∈S x i . Using e(S, x) as a measure of unhappiness with respect to x, we can try to find out a payoff vector which minimizes the maximum excess. We can construct a vector θ(x) by arranging the set of 2 n (subsets of N) excesses in decreasing order. Consider any two vectors y and z. With y < L z we mean that y is lexicographically smaller that z and we say that y ≤ L z to indicate that either y < L z or y = z.
DEFINITION 2.2 The prenucleolus of a game
Definitions 2.2 and 2.3 differ in terms of their domain of operation. While the prenucleolus lexicographically minimizes the excess vector across the set of all efficient payoff vectors, the nucleolus does the same minimization across the set of all imputations. It can be shown, however, that the nucleolus and prenucleolus coincide for TU games with non-empty core 3 and for superadditive TU games.
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An equivalent way of defining the two solution concepts is in terms of objections and counterobjections. We define these as follows.
• A pair (S, y) consisting of a coalition S and an efficient vector (imputation) y is an objection to the efficient vector (imputation) x if e(S, x) > e(S, y) (that is i∈S y i > i∈S x i ).
• A coalition T is a counterobjection to the objection (y, S) if e(T, y) > e(T, x) (that is i∈T x i > i∈T y i ) and e(T, y) ≥ e(S, x).
DEFINITION 2.4
The prenucleolus pη(N, v) of G is the set of all x ∈ X(N, v) such that for every objection (S, y) to x there is a counterobjection to (S, y). Here, y ∈ X(N, v).
DEFINITION 2.5
The nucleolus η(N, v) of G is the set of all imputations x ∈ I(N, v) such that for every objection (S, y) to x there is a counterobjection to (S, y). Here, y ∈ I(N, v).
The equivalence between Definitions 2.3 and 2.5 is derived in Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) . Since this result does not depend on the fact that attention is restricted to the set of imputations, it follows that Definitions 2.2 and 2.4 are also equivalent. We end this section with two observations on the coincidence of the Shapley value and the prenucleolus. First, consider a two player game ({1, 2}, v).
The fact that the excess vectors of the two singleton coalitions are identical along with the fact that the Shapley value is an efficient profile immediately implies that the Shapley value is also the prenucleolus. Next, define a game G = (N, v) to be symmetric if for all i, j ∈ N, v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S ∪ {j}) for all S ⊆ N − {i, j}. Again, it is straightforward to verify that for a symmetric game,
P S games
The set of symmetric games and two-players games discussed in the previous section are obviously a very small subset of coalitional form games. In this section, we show that the coincidence of Shapley value and the prenucleolus holds for a richer class of games which we call P S games. We also show that this class is more general than the class of 2-class games.
We refer to any TU game satisfying the P S property as a P S game. We denote this class of TU games by G(P S).
Proof: Let G = (N, v) ∈ G(P S) and consider the efficient profile
It is easy to verify that x * is unique and given by
We apply induction to prove Claim 1. First note that Claim 1 is true for any singleton coalition T = {i}. We assume that Claim 1 is true for any T ⊂ N with the property that |T | = m < n. To prove Claim 1, we will have to show that it holds for any T ′ = T ∪ {j} where j ∈ N − T . Given the vector x * and our assumption we get
From the P S property we know that
Substituting (3.2) in (3.1) and then simplifying it we get
Thus, we have established that if Claim 1 is true for any T ⊂ N with the property that |T | = m < n then Claim 1 is also true for any T ′ ⊂ N with the property that |T ′ | = m + 1. This proves Claim 1.
, . . . ,
From (3.4) it follows that the profile x * ∈ X(N, v) has the property that for every objection (S, y) to x * , the coalition T = N − S is a counterobjection to (S, y). To see this, consider any objection (S, y) to x * . This means that i∈S y i > i∈S x * i and hence e(N − S, x * ) < e(N − S, y). To show that T = N − S is a valid counterobjection to (S, y) we will now show that
The last equality follows from Claim 1 and condition (3.4). Hence from Definition 2.4 it follows that x * = pη(N, v).
= ψ(N, v). To prove this claim choose any ordering π = (π 1 , . . . , π n ) ∈ Π of the agents in N and its dual π
Using the definition of the Shapley value we get
for all i ∈ N. Therefore, x * = ψ(N, v).
The following two observations are immediate consequences of Theorem 3.1: (1) an additive TU game G is a P S game with c i = 2v(i) for all i ∈ N and (2) a zero-sum game is a P S game only if it is additive. REMARK 3.2 Note that the P S property, while strong, is different from convexity. A game G = (N, v) is convex if and only the marginal contribution of a player to a coalition is monotone nondecreasing with respect to set theoretic inclusion. The following examples shows that the P S property and convexity are independent. 
The class of k games
The following definition is due to Deng and Papadimitriou (1994) .
Observe that a 1-game is simply an additive game and hence it is a P S game. In different applications of cooperative game theory, the 2-game has led to the coincidence of prenucleolus and the Shapley value. 5 The following proposition establishes that every 2-game is a P S game. Proof: It follows from the definition of a 2-game that for all i ∈ N and all S ⊆ N − {i},
This shows that a 2-game is a P S game with c i = j∈N −{i} v(ij) for all i ∈ N.
The converse of Proposition 3.1 is not true. In particular, the TU game ({1, 2, 3}, v) in Example 3.1 is a P S game but not a 2-game.
Applications
In this section, we consider some applications of cooperative game theory where our main result can be applied.
Simple Games
Simple games-where the value of a coalition is either zero or one-are games used mainly to describe parliaments, councils and committees. They occur in many applications of game theory to political science. 6 The Shapley value in the context of simple games is a measure of the "power" of individual players and is better known as the Shapley-Shubik index. We shall need the following terminology in proving the main result of this section. Let G = (N, v) Case 2: We will show that the simple game must be either bi-dictatorial or a joint dictatorship. We first prove the following claim. Since c i = c j = 1, it follows that
Since v(S ∪ {j}) = 0, the monotonoicity of a simple game implies that v(S) = 0. If a simple game is bi-dictatorial, then players i and j are the two dictators and all other players in N − {i, j} are null players. Consider player i. Note that for player i, M i (S) = 0 if j ∈ S and M i (S) = 1 if j ∈ S. Thus, player i is a swing for a coalition S if j ∈ S and player i is not a swing for a coalition S if j ∈ S. Therefore, for all S ⊆ N − {i},
A same sort of reasoning holds for player j. Any player k ∈ N − {i, j} is a null player, we get c k = 0 for all k ∈ N − {i, j}. Therefore, if a simple game is bi-dictatorial then it is a P S game. Now consider a simple game which is a joint dictatorship with i and j the joint dictators and all other players in N − {i, j} are null players. For player i, M i (S) = 0 if j ∈ S and M i (S) = 1 if j ∈ S. Thus, player i is a swing for a coalition S if j ∈ S and player i is not a swing for a coalition S if j ∈ S.
Therefore, for all S ⊆ N − {i},
A similar reasoning holds for player j. Since any player k ∈ N − {i, j} is a null player, we get c k = 0 for all k ∈ N − {i, j}. This shows that a joint dictatorship is a P S game and concludes the proof of the theorem.
We conclude this section with two observations.
1. For a non-symmetric three player simple game, P S property is necessary for the coincidence. There can be exactly two types of non-symmetric three player simple games that are not P S games. They are
Thus, for non-symmetric three player games that are not P S games, ψ(N, v) = pη(N, v).
2.
For a non-symmetric simple game with more than three players, P S property is not necessary for the coincidence. Consider the TU game
).
Generalized queueing games
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of agents. Each agent wants to consume a service provided by a server. It is assumed that agents can be served only sequentially and that serving any agent occupies a unit of time. Each agent is identified with a waiting cost θ i ∈ ℜ + which is her disutility of waiting in the queue. If agent i occupies the σ i th position in the queue, then her cost is −(σ i − 1)θ i . Let θ N = (θ 1 , . . . , θ n ) be a profile of waiting costs of all the agents. Given a profile of waiting cost θ N = (θ 1 , . . . , θ n ) ∈ ℜ n + and a non-empty set S(⊆ N) of agents with associated waiting costs θ S = (θ i ) i∈S , a queue σ * (θ S ) = {σ * i (θ S )} i∈S ∈ τ (|S|) is said to be S-efficient if it minimizes the aggregate waiting costs for the set of S agents, that is σ * (θ S ) ∈ argmin σ∈τ (|S|) i∈S (σ i − 1)θ i where τ (|S|) is the set of all possible permutations of the integers {1, . . . , |S|}. The queue σ * (θ N ) is said to be an efficient queue for the set of N agents.
There are different ways of modeling queueing situation as a coalitional form TU game. Maniquet (1999) has one way of defining a queueing game in coalitional form. He defines v(S) = − i∈S (σ * i (θ S ) − 1)θ i for all S ⊆ N. This is an optimistic approach to the queueing problem because a coalition S thinks that its members will be served first in the queue (that is, before the agents of coalition N − S). Hence, they agree to the S-efficient queue amongst themselves. The other approach is the pessimistic approach of Chun (2004) where each coalition thinks that its members will be served only after all the members of their complement coalition has been served. So for Chun's
This is a very general way of representing a queueing situation as a coalitional form game. The first condition simply gives us the worth of a coalition. The second restriction simply guarantees that in a coalition the agent served earlier incur lower waiting cost than agents served later. The third restriction follows from efficiency condition for the grand coalition. The fourth restriction that a(1, 1) ∈ [−(n − 1), 0] is reasonable in the sense that the best thing that can happen to a single agent is that the agent gets first position in the queue implying a(1, 1) must be at most zero and the worst thing that can happen to a singleton coalition is to get the last queue position which means that a(1, 1) must be weakly greater than −(n − 1).
Maniquet's queueing game (see Maniquet (1999) ) and if a (|S|, σ * i (θ S )) = −(n − |S| + σ * (θ S ) − 1) for all S ⊆ N then we have Chun's queueing game (see Chun (2004) ). Using this general specification we try to identify the sub-class of generalized queueing games that are P S games. DEFINITION 4.13 A generalized queueing game G Q is said to be a rea-sonable queueing game if for all non-empty sets S ⊆ N,
where σ * i (θ S ) ∈ {1, . . . , |S|} and δ = − a(1,1) (n−1)
captures the externality imposed on agent i ∈ S by outsiders (that is, agents in N − S). It shows that the externality imposed by the outsiders (that is, N − S) is proportional to the number of outsiders. 
for all S ⊆ N − {i}. Here α i (S), β j (S) and γ l (S) have the following expressions:
We first argue that α i (S) must be independent of S. Consider any state θ N ∈ ℜ n + with the property that θ j = θ l for all j, l ∈ N with j = l, any agent i ∈ N and any two distinct sets S 1 and S 2 such that S 1 ⊂ S 2 ⊆ N −{i}. Using condition (4.8) for S 1 and for S 2 separately and then taking their difference we get
Now consider another state θ ′ N ∈ ℜ n + with the property that θ
. Therefore, the state θ ′ N is constructed from the state θ N by perturbing the waiting cost of agent i in such a way that the efficient queue remains unchanged under both the states. Like in the earlier case, consider the sets S 1 and S 2 . Using condition (4.8) for S 1 and for S 2 separately and then taking their difference we get
By subtracting (4.9) from (4.10) we get
Since the selection of S 1 and S 2 was arbitrary, it follows that for any i ∈ N, (a) α i (S) = α i for all S ⊆ N − {i}.
Observe that given any θ N = (θ 1 , . . . , θ n ) and any i ∈ N with queue position
From (1), (a) and (b) we get the following: Given any queue position σ * i (θ N ) = q ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for all x ∈ {1, . . . , n} and for all y ∈ {1, . . . , min[q, x]} a(x, y) + a(n + 1 − x, q + 1 − y) = −(q − 1) + a(1, 1) (4.12)
Consider a coalition S such that i, j ∈ S, x = |S| + 1, σ * i (θ N ) = q < σ * j (θ N ) = q + 1 and σ l (θ N ) > σ j (θ N ) for all l ∈ S. Using condition (4.12) for agents i and j separately we get a(x, 1) + a(n + 1 − x, q) = −(q − 1) + a(1, 1) (4.13)
a(x, 1) + a(n + 1 − x, q + 1) = −q + a(1, 1) (4.14)
Subtracting (4.14) from (4.13) we get
Solving condition (4.15) we get for all q ≤ r ≡ n + 1 − x, a(r, q) = a(r, 1)
Using condition (4.16) in the generalized queueing problem we get for all
Using observation (b) in condition (4.12) for q = 1 we get for all x ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1},
Now consider the term β j (S) = a |S| + 1, σ * j (θ S∪{i} ) − a |S|, σ * j (θ S ) in condition (4.8). We argue that for |N| ≥ 3, β j (S) term is independent of S for any j ∈ S ⊆ N − {i} such that σ * j (θ N ) < σ * i (θ N ). Consider any state θ N ∈ ℜ n + with the property that θ l = θ k for all k, l ∈ N with k = l and consider j ∈ T 1 ⊂ T 2 ⊆ N − {i}. By applying condition (4.8) for the sets T 1 and T 2 separately and then taking the difference we get
Observe that in (4.19), condition (a) guarantees that the left hand side is independent of θ i . Now consider another state θ Observe that the right hand side of (4.27) is independent of S. Proposition 4.3 establishes that for a reasonable queueing game, the Shapley value will coincide with prenucleolus. Observe, that if in a reasonable queueing game, δ = 0 then we have Maniquet's optimistic queueing game which gives no weightage to the players outside the coalition. If δ = 1 we have Chun's pessimistic queueing game that gives full weightage to the players outsider the coalition. Therefore, our reasonable class of queueing games includes all queueing games that are a convex combination of the optimistic and the pessimistic queueing games and all these games are P S games.
Conclusion
The chief contribution of this paper has been to shed further light on the coincidence of the Shapley value and the prenucleolus. As noted earlier, these solutions are motivated by very different concerns and as such, there is no reason to expect them to coincide. We have extended previous work (Deng and Papadimitriou (1994) , Nouweland et al (1996) and Chun and Hokari (2004) ) on this coincidence by providing a more general sufficiency condition. In addition, we have used this sufficiency condition to identify the subclasses of simple games and queueing games where this coincidence holds. A remaining agenda is to identify a necessary condition for this coincidence, at least in the context of simple games and queueing games.
